I’m pleased to get this considered analysis by Adam Fitch.
(Indeed, I’m always pleased to get thoughtful comments from Price Tags readers. And, with a little bit of editing, I’m pleased to post them.)
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In my opinion, there is a simple and straightforward explanation why this issue (of the transit referendum has provoked such a dispute since Christy Clark initiated it in March or April 2012.
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There are two parts to my thesis:
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1. It comes down to a clash of paradigms – two paradigms that are incompatible with eachother.
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2. From Christy Clark’s perspective, Translink has lost its negotiating power
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First, there is TransLink’s paradigm that capital funding for transit is a process of negotiation. They published their long term Regional Transportation Strategy in May 2013, but I am sure that it is based on earlier versions. In it, they state that the long term capital expenditure plan is “$5 Billion to $15 Billion”. That is obviously a negotiating position – ask for $15 billion, and maybe you will get $5 billion at the end of the day.
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And who were they. negotiating with? The provincial and federal governments, of course. Primarily, the provincial government. And they had reason to have such hopes, because former premier Gordon Campbell had announced a $14 billion transit expenditure plan some years ago.
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But, in order to have a successful negotiation, the two parties have to have approximately equal power, and each has to be offering and asking for approximately equal amounts.
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At one time, that may have been the case. Let us not consider the Expo Line or the Millennium Line projects. Both were conceived before TransLink was brought into existence, and were therefore provincial projects, not TransLink projects. (The Millennium line was announced in 1998 and completed in 2002. TransLink was started in 1999. So I believe that the M line was a provincial project, but I am not sure.)
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So let’s talk about the Canada Line and the Evergreen Line.Both were conceived under the TransLink regime. But both were ultimately announced by the provincial government, so it is confusing, but I think that they will be perceived by the public to be provincial projects.
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In any case, the trade-off of the negotiation is that the province delivers the funding, and TransLink delivers the project. In the end, the province can claim the credit for the projects, and presumably, reap some political benefit- i.e.: re-election.
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If you subscribe to Michael Smyth’s way of thinking, this is all directly related to electoral politics and political geography. He says: you will get the major transit or highway investment in the electoral districts where the government party holds the riding, and you will not get it where you don’t.
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Exhibits he has given: The Inland Island Highway on Vancouver Island: all NDP ridings during an NDP government. Ditto: the Millennium Line, which he calls the NDP Party Line.
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I think one could make a similar argument for the Canada Line: It connects mostly Liberal ridings during a Liberal government.
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However, that whole calculus has fast been fading of late. You can commit a whole lot of provincial expenditure to a given riding, and still not win the riding come the next election. I cannot think of specific examples, but I am sure that you can.
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One more thing on negotiations. TransLink may have been operating under the assumption that such negotiations would take place behind closed doors, between bureaucrats – say between TransLink staff and MoTI staff, to be eventually ratified by politicians. But that is no longer the paradigm of today. Now, negotiations must be much more open, transparent, and public.
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Now, on to the new paradigm. Christy Clark’s position is that, of you want public – i.e.: provincial – money, you need to get public consent via referendum. This seems reasonable – democratic and all that.
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Of course, that didn’t apply to a bunch of recent provincial transportation expenditures made by her government – the Hwy 99 upgrade, the Hwy 1/ Port Mann upgrade, the SFPR, the Pitt River Bridge, etc. but that is another matter altogether. Likewise, it did not apply to her Massey Tunnel replacement announcement. Likewise, TransLink did consult much on the Golden Ears Bridge project. But I guess that the calculus with all of those was that the congestion was so severe, and the need for a solution was so pressing, that consensus was assumed.
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Anyway, I guess from Christy Clark’s perspective, what is the possible benefit in committing the provincial government to a major transit expenditure in Metro Vancouver. The political calculus just is not there. She could not even win a Vancouver west-side riding which had been solidly Liberal forever, when she was premier. What would be the point of gambling a big provincial expenditure to secure it? Could go against her.
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On the other hand, look what she did when she won Kelowna-Westside. She announced a highway improvement expenditure within days after her by-election win there.
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In conclusion, back to the clash of paradigms. TransLink wants big bucks. Cannot come to an internal consensus agreement on precisely how the bucks would be spent. Assumes that the decision will be made by fiat, behind closed doors, as it has always been done for the last 30 years. That is a reasonable assumption.
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Provincial government position is: if you want the bucks, you convince the electorate / taxpayers that you deserve it, and then go to them in a referendum and get consent. Also a reasonable position.
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But the two paradigms are not compatible.
“The Millennium line was announced in 1998 and completed in 2002. TransLink was started in 1999. So I believe that the M line was a provincial project, but I am not sure.”
I was actually working for what was then still BC Transit. The project was a light rail line that would run along Broadway from UBC then out to Lougheed where it would split into two branches – one to Coquitlam and one to New Westminster. We had a neat video showing a Strasburg LRT running past Commercial Drive station, and I went to a fascinating charette to redesign Brentwood. Then I was taken by surprise by a Media Event featuring Glen Clark announcing a new SkyTrain line. Only a select few at BCT knew of that ahead of time. The province set up a project office for the M line with no BCT staff in it.
“So let’s talk about the Canada Line and the Evergreen Line.Both were conceived under the TransLink regime. But both were ultimately announced by the provincial government, so it is confusing, but I think that they will be perceived by the public to be provincial projects.”
The Canada Line was never a regional priority. Glen Clark had told BC Transit that they could “spend what you like on the B Line, there’ll never be LRT to Richmond”. But the government changed. At the time Ken Dobell was CEO of Translink and he bullied everyone to support a tube under Cambie. There was effectively no real comparison of alternatives – he knew what he wanted and he was going to get it. He went on to become Gordon Campbell’s top bureaucrat.
There was a genuine attempt at Translink to assess what to do with the dropped leg of the T line out to Coquitlam. It was run by Clark Lim – now at UBC. Surface LRT was the clear winner – as is usually the case for the sort of ridership we expect in Metro Vancouver suburbs when an objective cost/benefit analysis is done. The choice of SkyTrain for the Evergreen Line must have been a provincial one since by then there was no longer a Translink Board composed of elected officials. That bit the dust over defiance of the minister on the Canada Line. By the way, both Evergreen and Canada Lines were going to be built simultaneously. That was the promise made to the Board by the Minister to get them to change their mind.