Bob Ransford added this comment to the post below, providing delicious details to the story about how the post-Expo lands on the North Shore of False Creek were sold by the provincial government. It’s a backroom saga few are aware of – and certainly deserves a foreground treatment:
.
Vancouver might have been a very different city or, at least, have a very different downtown, had it not been for a series of political battles and ultimate outcomes within the provincial government over the sale of the former Expo lands. I worked in the Premier’s Office between 1986 and 1988, when the decision was made to sell the lands to Li Ka-shing’s Hutchison Whampoa Company of Hong Kong.
That decision was a VERY controversial one within the Vander Zalm government. Few will remember that the Premier was very much in favour of selling the lands to a local group– primarily led by the late Peter Toigo and backed by a few financiers, including the late Jack Poole. Their plan for the site was much less ambitious than what we see there today and they included a permanent amusement park on a large portion of the site. They claimed to have had initial discussions with the Disney Corp at the time. BCDC was responsible for the site post-Expo and I believe David Podmore was working there with the President Kevin Murphy. Peter Brown chaired BCDC’s board. Grace McCarthy was the Minister responsible for BCDC.
Most at BCDC were skeptical of the ability of the Toigo consortium’s ability to execute a development and strongly resisted the Premier’s intervention. Minister McCarthy had been approached by one of Li’s North American representatives about Hutchison Whampoa bidding. She travelled to Hong Kong to meet with Li’s group and returned and instructed the BCDC board to begin talks with them, without letting the Premier know this. Toigo learned of this and went to the Premier and encouraged him to stop the sale.
I remember a particular morning in the Premier’s Office when the Premier, his Chief of Staff David Poole and I were taking a conference call on a speaker phone from one of the BCDC directors immediately following a Board meeting where David Poole had been barred from attending. I don’t recall who the director was, but they advised that the Board has just decided to reject the Toigo bid. The Premier was not a happy man. That’s when an internal political war was launched, eventually leading to Mrs. McCarthy and AG Brian Smith both resigning from Cabinet. That began the slow demise of Vander Zalm’s government.
To her credit, Mrs. McCarthy persisted in her efforts to have Li’s bid accepted. She believed he had an international focus, a vision for the site and an ability to turn that vision into a reality.
So began False Creek North and the Yaletown of today and the first wave of late 20th century Asian immigration to Vancouver, as Li’s group launched residential pre-sales in Hong Kong as fear around the turnover to China was first setting in.
.
Any other insiders care to contribute?
Might I ask a few questions:
a) who was he seller ? The city or the province ?
b) why did the seller decide to sell the WHOLE parcel and not 1-2 acre sites to maximize value ?
c) Why did the city not develop a master plan, similar to what UBC does today on its UBC Campus, and then sell off smaller parcels in stages for far higher land value with more control over parks, pacing, appearance etc ? Was it not skilled in it ? Did it lack expertise ? Was there a rush to get maximum $s on day 1, perhaps to fill a budget hole ?
d) how would the city handle it today, 30 years later, if they could do it again in a similar situation (say Langara Golf Course) ? ie what lessons were learned ?
I have wonder the same questions. Why couldn’t it have gone to Auction?
The vendor was the Province, which owned the land in the BC Development Corp (a Crown corp)
It was thought that selling the entire site would result in transformation of this area of the city.
There was no real financial pressure to sell. In fact, the Province subsequently spent tens of millions of dollars completing the environmental remediation on the site.
The Province didn’t see it role as one as a land developer. They wanted the land to become an activator of urban renewal following in the excitement generated by Expo ’86.
The Province really didn’t care what the City’s plans were and the politicians I worked with were fully prepared to bypass any City authority if they had to.
Thank you.
Why didn’t the city buy it, then rezone and resell in smaller chunks ? Did it lack the expertise at the time ? Would it be done differently today ? Looking at UBC, it’s own city really, they did an ambitious master plan and now are selling one acre highrise sites from $20-$40M .. one or two a year .. very very profitably. Why did Vancouver not do that then ?
The responses above are interesting. The city and province were not on good terms at the time and the sale of the Expo lands was really a ‘f— you’ from the province to the city. The lands were one of the last large parcels in the heart of the city and have had a tremendous effect on Vancouver, particularly affordability of housing and daily life for the average person.
Of course the city had the expertise to develop these lands and probably would’ve done so in a more inclusive and possibly more progressive manner than what has transpired. We’ll never know. The city likely wouldn’t have had the funds to purchase the land and undertake the environmental remediation of the site and I’m sure the province at the time would not have been so generous to the city as it was to Li Ka-shing’s Hutchison Whampoa Company.
Interesting to get a rare glimpse into the right wing coalition of the time’s internal politics.
Well said, Blair. If I’m correct, your comment about affordability can be interpreted to mean it (the Expo lands development) drove housing prices upward. This was a pretty affordable city before then, IMO.
If the above is not your intent, please clarify. Thanks.
House price increases in Vancouver were a combination of two factors:
a) lower and lower interest rates – and as such we have seen house/condo prices worldwide go up since the 1980’s by 100, 200 or 400%+
b) higher than average Asian immigration due to exodus from initially HongKong (due to the uncertainty created when the colony lost its British status and reverted back to China) and later from mainland China due to its opening up of borders and emerging of middle and upper class
Had the land been sold to a non-HongKong developer Vancouver would still be very Asian today, perhaps not quite as much and not quite as fast.
Vancouver, or the province, or both, could have certainly monetized this prime piece of real estate better, as we see today in Surrey or UBC, and soon Jericho lands for the feds and First “Nations”. Certainly an expensive lesson learned.
There is no way that adding 1000s of condo units to the city’s supply could be blamed for the costs today. Anyone who has the slightest knowledge of economics can see that.
A different City? I don’t think so.
The first scheme for the redevelopment of the expo lands was a scheme in which residential towers occupied islands connected by bridges. This idea was not accepted by the City and a process was initiated to determine urban design principles that would guide the development of the Expo Lands.
The ultimate appearance of these lands began with the engineering layout for Expo / Pacific Blvd, This roadway was imagined by the Engineering Department to be a high capacity beltline running along the creek between Yaletown and False Creek. In the Expo Era, transportation engineers argued for capacity and speed, while the planners argued for pedestrian space and pedestrian scale at the street edge.
The problem of Expo / Pacific boulevard is that it is a wide crossing for pedestrians, a point that was argued by the urban designers of the day, but ignored as an issue in favour of the popular car centric engineering view of vehicle traffic held by many during this period in history.
The Planning Department contemplated a plus 15 system to solve this issue. Fortunately this idea was relegated to the dust bin of history through the strength of arguments made by the urban design team.
The design principle of extending the street grid into the site helped to integrate the new city with the old city. Creating street end views to the water was also established as an urban design guideline.
The land division by street layout gave rise to blocks of land which were divided into development parcels and open space. The allowable density on each parcel generated the form of development we see today. Selections for views, access to daylight and fresh air refined the massing of a neighbourhood. These design ideas and practices were embedded in an Official Development Plan drafted by City Staff and adopted by Council.
What is interesting about this story is that it illustrates how a fantastical design idea by the proponents morphed into the natural expansion of the City grid and extension of the development pattern seen elsewhere in the city. The podium and the point tower became the refinement to the high rise. This pattern emerged due to a strong urban design tradition practiced within the Planning Department and its associated panels, advisory committees and commissions. The governance structure for land development in the City of Vancouver was well established at the time.
The City chose to integrate new with old at the outset. Exclusivity was rejected. The process of design became inclusive reflecting the values of Vancouverites and these values became entrenched in the Official Development Plan for these lands.
jolson urban designer.
Thanks, Bob and everyone else. My view on the sale process, esp with respect to the Li family agenda, is outlined here: http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199256969.do It’s important to keep in mind their objectives, the timing, and other factors like the market crash of 1987. There area lot of broad factors that came together at this historic moment and brought this sale, and development, into place. Kris Olds
I am writing a paper on immigration and multiculturalism in Canada for my college. How much of the downtown area do the Chinese actually own? For instance, in terms of area, would it be safe to say that at least 50% of the downtown area is owned by Chinese developers?
The Plaza of Nations should be given back to the Province of BC because it was sold in 1988 by Li Cashing to raise money so he could pay the provincial government led by Vanderzalm for the purchase of the entire Expo 86 lands. The Plaza of Nations was ‘promised’ verbally by Li Cashing to Mayor Campbell of the city of Vancouver as a community venue which he never got down in writing. The CoV, and the province of BC are the losers in all these because they thought that the deal will enrich ($336M) the provincial government. The developments of the Expo 86 lands became to this day an exclusive enclave for mostly foreign owners. Posted at Vancouver Is Awesome 22 Sept 2021.