John Quiggin speculates on US foreign policy vis-a-vis a hypothetical post-authoritarian Middle East:
The point applies most obviously in relation to oil. The idea that the US can legitimately use its military power to ensure continued access to oil resources rests, in large measure, on the (not entirely unfounded) assumption that those controlling the resources are a bunch of sheikhs and military adventurers who happened to be in the right place, with guns, at the right time. Without the Arab exception, the idea of oil as a special case, not subject to the ordinary assumption that resources are the property of the people in whose country they are found, will also be hard to sustain.
Certainly if you were just to look at things in coldly rational terms, the resource-rich country the US should be seeking to dominate militarily is Canada, located conveniently next door. And, indeed, in the first half of the nineteenth century that’s how hawkish American politicians saw things. But it would be politically unacceptable in a modern context to try to bully Canada or Norway into coughing up oil.
Hardly necessary to bully us. We quite understand the necessity of maintaining a regular flow of oil to the U.S. NAFTA makes the point explicitly: the Canadian government cannot have policies that “interfere with the normal functioning of energy markets in North America … Article 605 (stipulates) that energy exports to the United States as a percentage of total output cannot fall.” [Source]
Indeed, though we’d never phrase it this way, we’re also quite ready to sacrifice the Canadian North, whether through the destruction that comes through exploration, development and shipping, or through the consequences of climate change, to keep the oil flowing.
Same source:
“Contrary to some claims, NAFTA does not commit Canada to exporting a certain share of its energy supply to the United States regardless of Canadian needs.”